Introduction
Under pressure of modern society railway companies such as the Dutch Railway Company (NS) have t o operate more flexibly and more cost-effectively. This is an important reason for the increased use of computer equipment. The construction of control systems for railway yards is an intricate task at which railway companies have reached a high level of safety and precision. In order to keep up this high level of quality and to keep costs under control, NS is looking for techniques that can help to design and validate the new computerized control equipment more quickly and cheaply. This has motivated us to investigate whether formal methods could be of any help.
We have chosen to take a particular railway yard as the major object of our study. This is the railway yard at the station Hoorn-Kersenboogerd, which is situated about 40 km north of Amsterdam. HoornKersenboogerd is the smallest railway yard where the new generation of control equipment was installed at the time we started our investigations. A simplified layout of Hoorn-Kersenboogerd is drawn in Figure 2 . It essentially consists of 21 track sections, 10 signals (with lights), four points, one railway crossing with barriers, two platforms and a dead end. The control of train movement at the Dutch station Hoorn-Kersenboogerd is organized in three layers. The bottom layer consists of electromechanical devices that are directly connected to the railway. These devices perform low level operations, for instance switching of points, detection of failures and detection of occupation of track sections.
The top layer is responsible to guide trains according to the timetable. It operates in combination with human operators. The top layer basically generates simple commands for the bottom layer. It may request to switch a particular point and to turn a particular signal to yellow or green. The top layer is a rather complicated piece of software as it must interface to human operators, make scheduling decisions and translate all into the low level primitives of the actuators at the railroad. The engineers of the Dutch railways have adopted the view that due to both human intervention and the complexity of the software it cannot be guaranteed that the top layer always operates safely. So, it can happen that this layer sends an erroneous command to the bottom layer.
In order to guarantee safe operation of railroads an intermediate layer has been introduced. The task of this layer is to check whether the commands of the upper layer can safely be issued to the electromechanical devices, although in a few cases it makes some control decisions. Moreover, the intermediate layer must act appropriately when a hazardous situation is detected.
If a hazardous situation occurs, emergency actions are performed; in the worst case all signals are turned red.
At Hoorn-Kersenboogerd this intermediate layer is implemented using a Vital Processor Interlocking ( V P I ) . A VPI can be characterized as a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) that is tuned for use in a railway environment. The VPI is built by the General Railway Signal Company. The specification of and design rules for programming a VPI are made by NS. It is clear that the safety of the railway hinges on the correct operation of the VPI and in particular on its program. The NS is fully aware of this and has developed a strict sequence of checks to guarantee the quality of this program.
In this paper we address the question how to establish safety of VPIs using formal methods in an efficient way. This question can be split into two parts. The first one is how one must do it in principle, whereas the second one is to find a satisfactory concrete description of safety and to carry out the actual verifications. In this paper we deal with the first part. We explain what safety requirements look like, how they can be described on an abstract level and how they can be verified automatically. The concrete safety requirements are formulated and verified in [13] . The techniques outlined here appear sufficient to establish safety of the VPI that is currently installed at HoornKersenboogerd.
This paper consists of three main sections and summarizes [15] in which the transformations and classifications that are sketched in here are fully defined. In Section 2 the main features of the VPI and its program for the situation at Hoorn-Kersenboogerd are modeled in pCRL [17, 161 . It then describes, by examples, how safety requirements look like. This is done in the modal logic for pCRL [HI. It appears that all properties make reference to limited steps in the future or in the past.
There are three reasons for looking at VPIs on such an abstract level. The most important one is that an abstract, concise description allows a quick understanding of the basic operation of a VPI and its correctness criteria.
The second reason is that it paves the way for future study of VPIs . One might for instance think about the study of liveness and fairness properties, but also about the study of communicating VPIs, which have already been installed. The third reason is that the techniques that we use to verify properties are applicable to many other problems. Only too often, techniques for particular purposes are developed in a restricted setting, while in a more general setup, these techniques could have been communicated and applied much more easily, instead of being re-invented.
Section 3 deals with the question how these kinds of properties can be verified. The basic observation is that VPIs are basically very close to propositional logic. We transform both VPIs and safety requirements into propositional logic in such a way that a requirement holds if the formula is a tautology.
Section 4 presents the tools that have been used to transform the Vital Logic Code and to decide the truth of the formulas that have been generated. We have tried quite a number of tools for proving the formulas, but it turns out that only a few did actually yield results. One tool, the propositional theorem prover of Logikkonsult in Sweden [27] could prove (or disprove) all formulas that we presented to it. In this way all safety properties about Hoorn-Kersenboogerd in [13] could be verified. We conclude this paper with some thoughts about future developments.
Related Work
The literature in which railway yards are discussed can roughly be divided into two categories. In the first general techniques and ideas are illustrated with examples inspired by railways, whereas in the second focus is basically on railway related questions.
As railway related examples are particularly popular we do not attempt to give an overview of the first category (but see e.g. [lo, 11, 221) .
In the other category specific systems being designed or used by railway companies and their suppliers are subject of study.
The system used in the U.K. by British Rail is the Solid State Interlocking ( S S I ) . SSIs received considerable attention in the literature [l, 4,8, 20, 25 , 301. The SSI is a more complex machine than the VPI. One reason. for this is that the SSI is used to take more complex scheduling decisions than the VPI. Therefore, the more involved methods for verification as presented in these documents were not necessary for the VPI. Some Swedish interlockings seem to have been verified using tautology checking in a way that is similar to what is presented in this paper [27] . In France a consortium of GEC Alsthom, Matra Transport and CSEE executed a number of projects in the railway sector where formal specification and formal verification were applied [9] . At Siemens work is done on verification by means of process algebra [12] .
Introduction t o the VPI
In this section a short introduction to the VPI is given. This section does not provide a detailed description of VPls. Detailed information can be found in [19, 261. These documents are confidential. However, the presentation here is sufficient for understanding the main operating principles needed in our approach.
In Figure 2 , a schematic view of VPIs and their environment is presented. The box with the text 'Presentation €4 Scheduling' is the top layer from the introduction. It presents all equipment for interfacing with traffic control personnel, software for scheduling and routing decisions. At this layer commands are generated to be executed by the track side modules. These commands are all quite simple: 'turn signal 60 to a color better than or equal to yellow' or 'close the barriers at level crossing 350'. A VPI can only make some small decisions, e.g., turn a signal red just after a train has passed, or turn signal 60 to green (that's better than yellow) if that is considered safe. A VPI acts as an intelligent filter between Presentation €4 Scheduling and the track side modules. In general, one can say that a VPI is not aware of the scheduling, routing or planning strategy, nor of the timetable that has to be followed. Its only responsibility is to guarantee safety of the railroad.
Operation of a VPI is as follows. A VPI executes endlessly control cycles, each taking exactly one sec- ond. At the beginning of a cycle input is read. Using this input and the internal variables the output and new values for the internal variables are calculated. At the end of a cycle the outputs are simultaneously output to the external world.
In pCRL [17] this is characterized as the simple process defined by Xf,g in Figure 1 . In the full version of this paper [15] it is described how f and g can be constructed from the vital logic code as functions described in pCRL. This is slightly tedious as one must avoid that the description o f f blows up.
It should be noted that the semantics of pCRL yields a labeled transition system describing the possible behavior of a VPI. For both pCRL and transition systems numerous automated analysis techniques are available. However, as the state space of VPIs is large, we found them not applicable. For Hoorn-Kersenboogerd the size of the reachable state space lies somewhere between 1030 and lO5Oo.
Note that the form of the specification in Figure 1 is close to the UNITY format [3] , a Linear Process Operator [2] or an I/O-automaton [23] . This is of interest because there is quite some experience with (hand based) verifications in these formats. We have not looked into such an approach but it might be a feasible alternative for very large and complex railway yards for which the automatic analysis technique de- 
Vital Logic Code
The program of a VPI consists of a number of parts.
The most important part of the program is specified in a language which is called the Vital Logic Code (VLC). Other program parts specify, e.g., declaration of variables, mappings of variable names to hardware ports, names of inputs and output ports. We ignore these other parts.
We explain VLC code via the example program in Figure 3 , which consists of a number of lines taken from the original code of the VPI at HoornKersenboogerd. Due to the size and confidentiality of the code, we do not give the full program. We provide the code in the same syntax as used by the Dutch railways, which indeed gives a somewhat dated impression. the tracks to be free. For instance, it is used to shunt trains. Flashing green has the same meaning as green but allows a lower speed than green. It is not used in the program in Figure 3 .
The variable 60-66-BGZ expresses that a train can drive from signal 60 in the direction of signal 66, without trains coming from the reverse direction. This for instance means that signal 66 is red. In the program in Figure 3 we have omitted the line that defines it. The variables 60-GZ-CS stands for a request of the Presentation & Scheduling layer to allow a train to pass signal 60 where the train driver can expect the tracks to be free and the points fixed in an appropriate direction (signal 60 should become yellow or better). The variable 60-CGZ-CS stands for the same request, but now the tracks may be occupied. In this last case signal 60 should become flashing yellow.
Inspection of the code shows how signal 60 is controlled. We describe the meaning of the variables that are used, but we leave it to the reader to figure out the details of the program. The variables 66B-TP, 66A-TP, 74B-TP express that sections 66B, 66A and 74B are reported free. The variable 74A-WS expresses that a train will drive to the west on section 74A. The variables 68-GL and 68-GR express that signal 68 is yellow or green, respectively. The abbreviation GL comes from 'geel', meaning yellow in Dutch.
The variables 60-GLFL, 60-GL and 60-GR say that signal 60 may go to flashing yellow, yellow or green, respectively. The same variable names with the extension ACO are connected directly to the lamps in the signal. We can see that 60-GR-ACO becomes high, i.e., signal 60 becomes green, if signal 68 shows yellow or green, the track sections after the signal are free, no train can drive in the reverse direction and the Presentation €4 Scheduling layer has requested for yellow or better. Note that if signal 68 is red or flashing yellow, then signal 60 can at best become yellow. Note also that if signal 60 is neither green, yellow or flashing yellow it becomes red by default.
Safety Requirements
In order to determine whether a VPI is 'safe' we must define the notion safety. This seems rather straightforward at first sight. Railway traffic is safe whenever it is not possible that trains collide or derail. But a VPI does not guarantee this. It is the cooperation between traffic control, train drivers and computer equipment that maintain safety on the tracks.
The VPI only guarantees aspects of safety that appear to have developed during the years. It is a separate project to find a good and reasonable complete set of requirements expressing the notion of a 'safe VPI' correctly. The results of this project are reported in [13] . In principle the VPI guarantees that all equipment is working correctly and that train traffic outside the in%uence and responsibility of the train driver is safe. For instance points must not switch when a train runs over it, and if a train passes a green signal, then the railroad after that signal must not be occupied. In the last case the train driver drives too fast to stop in time.
Moreover, the safety requirements must be espressed using the variables of a V P I . A VPI has no knowledge about the speed of trains. A safety requirement of the form 'a train is not allowed to drive over a reverse point with speed higher than 60 km/h' has no meaning in the context of VPIs. But the following safety requirement is actually formulated correctly: 'If a point is turned reverse, then the ATB2 is set to 60 km/h'. Moreover, the safety of VPIs should not be expressed using internal variables. It is cleaner to express correctness in terms of external behavior. In this latter case the notion 'safety' is independent of any particular implementation. Safety can be studied independently and the acquired knowledge immediately carries over to other systems. This means that safety is expressed in terms of the input and output variables of a VPI.
2ATB stands for Automatische TreinBeinvloeding. It is a system that limits the speed of trains to a certain maximum. The notation v.6O-GR-ACO represents the position in the vector w that corresponds to the value of The requirements in JUST express that if something is being sent to the railway yard at a particular moment in time, something should have been sent a limited amount of time ago. In order to refer in these requirements to input also, we assume that the function g (in Figure 1 ) also sends the input that the VPI has just read, to the tracks. These requirements have the form:
60-GR-ACO.
where # and 4 are again propositional formulas. The operator JZkC1 expresses that if q5 is valid now, k seconds (i.e., 2k+ 1 visible actions) ago II, must have been valid.
A typical example of a requirement in this class is the following. If a signal shows green, then for two seconds it has been measured that the tracks behind the signal are free. In terms of the example in Figure 2 this can be restated as if signal 60 shows green, then during the last 2 seconds track section 66A was free. Of course this should also hold for track sections 66B and 74B but we restrict ourselves to one section to keep the formulas small. This is expressed using the external variable 66A-TRPR-DI that is a so-called Direct Input and is directly connected to a hardware device measuring track occupation. This variable is different from the variable 66A-TP in the program in Figure 3 . 66A-TP is an internal variable of which the meaning differs slightly from 66A-TRPR-DI.
This gives us the following three safety requirements. Note that if variable 66A-TRPR-DI is high, section 66A is free. Note also that we assume that our model of the VPI sends its input to the tracks. So, w.66A-TRPR-DI makes sense.
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The first requirements is STATIC. The others belong to JUST.
The requirements in NEXT express that if something is being sent to the railway now, then after some limited amount of time, something else will be sent. These requirements have the form:
where q5 and II, are propositional formulas. The operator N"x expresses that m visible actions later the formula x must hold.
A typical requirement is that if a train is detected on track section 66B and signal 68 shows green, then the barriers of a railway crossing 350 must be closing two seconds later. Formally, this is described as follows:
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In the next section we explain how to verify such safety requirements.
Verification of Safety Requirements
There are different methods to establish the truth of modal formulas with respect to a concrete transition system. This is a well established field often referred to by the phrase model checking. The classical approach towards model checking is the following. The transition system is represented explicitly, and a standard algorithm is applied to verify the truth of the formula [7] . Using this method the truth of formulas can be verified with respect to transition systems with up to lo6 states.
By using smart abstraction criteria, abstract interpretation or clever encodings modal formulas with respect to considerable larger state spaces can be verified. In [6] it is claimed that with BDD (Binary Decision Diagram) encodings [5] even systems with more than states can be handled. Experience shows that this is strongly dependent on the structure of the processes under study. It even happens that BDD encodings perform worse than the classical approach.
It may be clear that state spaces of VPIs are so large that specific techniques are needed to perform model checking. These techniques must employ the structure of the VPI. As Vital Logic Code resembles propositional logic very much we have tried to transform the question whether a formula holds with respect a particular transition system into the question whether a certain propositional formula is a tautology. The classification into STATIC, JUSTand NEXT turns out to be convenient for this purpose.
The transformation into propositional logic
In this section we describe, by example, how we can prove that a VPI-program satisfies a safety requirement by transforming them both to propositional logic. This gives a good impression of the general technique, as the transformations are rather straightforward. In [15] it is described how the transformations can be carried out in detail. Basically, we transform the requirement to a formula 7(1 and the program to some formula @ and prove whether CP .--) 7(1 is a tautology. The VLC is transformed in a number of steps. First, the timers are re- We now describe the transformations in more detail. First we eliminate timers. We illustrate how this is done in general via the following two lines taken from the example in Figure 3 . We have replaced 2 by n to make the description slightly more general.
TIME DELAY=n SECONDS BOOL 350-XTES=(.N.350-XR-DBO*VRDFRNT-DI)
First we remove TIME.. .SECONDS. Then we make n + 1 copies of the remaining line. The variable 350-XTES at the left side is numbered from the second copy with 1,. . . In order to verify formulas from the classes JUST and NEXT, there is a simple technique. Put some copies of the program in sequence and label the variables in the consecutive programs with an increasing time index. In this way the executions of the program can be expressed during a larger span in time.
For formulas in the class JUST the variables in every copy referring i seconds in the past get i subscripts J . We adopt the convention that the symbols 3 and n/ neutralize each other. The k-copy justtransformation is obtained by making k labeled copies of the program. For a formula that refers one step back we get the following, based on the first four lines in the program above. ... 
(.N.~~~-XR-DBON*VRDFRNT-DI)
In the same way we can define the k-copy nexttransformation. If we want to verify a formula that looks 2k -1 visible actions forward, then we make k copies of the program and label the variables in every consecutive copy with one extra subscript N .
It is now straightforward to transform the programs obtained in this way to a formula in proposition logic. Put brackets around the expression at the right hand 
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We refer to this translated VLC code by Q V L C . Now we know how to translate a VLC program. Translating a formula is also rather straightforward. Consider a formula in the class STATIC of the form:
We remove U V v .~~) .
All prefixes v before a variable are also removed and all output and internal variables get a subscript N . The first correctness formula in Section 2.2 is translated to:
SO-GR-ACON + ( 6 8 -c L~ V ~~-G R N ) .
We abbreviate this formula by $. The correctness of the VPI with respect to this static property can be established by proving the following propositional formula a tautology: We show the result of transforming the last requirement of Section 2.2:
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We have sketched in this section a way to transform the question whether a VLC satisfies a modal formula into the question whether a particular formula is a tautology in propositional logic. The next section deals with tools that help in carrying out the transformation. We moreover describe our experiments with tools for proving or disproving these formulas. 
Tool support for VPI
Transformation tools
The following transformation tools were constructed. 0 A tool for elimination of timer assignments. No tool was constructed for the translation of modal formulas. The reason for this is that the modal formulas that we encountered were small. The translation is therefore most easily done by hand. However, such a tool could have been constructed easily using the ASF+ SDF Met a-environment .
All tools, except the simulator, can be used stand alone and as part of the ASF+SDF Metaenvironment. The simulator only runs in the hiletaenvironment. Stand alone, the tools have a very simple interface: read a text file, process the contents, output a text file and terminate. Combinations of tools are then easily constructed using pipes. Static semantical checks are not performed, but could have been specified. Syntax checking is for free with the ASF+SDF Meta-environment and implicit in all stand alone tools.
An option of the ASF+SDF Meta-environment is to generate the tools in C. In general this gives an efficiency gain of several orders of magnitude. But, this route turned out not to be practical due to the enormous memory consumption of this code. In order to get satisfactory performance for the larger specifications the tools were constructed in a straightforward fashion by translating the ASF+SDF specifications by hand into C using Lex and Yacc. programs.
Program slicing
Intuitively, a slice of P for the variables z,y, z , . . . is the program one obtains from P by removing all assignments from P that do not contribute to the values of 2, y, z, . . .. For an overview of the literature on program slicing see for instance [28] . We slice the VLC with respect to the variables that occur in the safety requirement that we want to prove after doing the k-copy just-transformation or the k-copy nexttransformation. Actually, we used backward static slicing, i.e., select in a backward manner a part of the program statements without special assumptions on the input of the program.
Slicing is of practical importance to the verifica- 
Tautology checkers
It is well known that satisfiability of propositional formulas is NP-complete. Also, the question whether a formula is a tautology is CO-NP complete and as such it is not at all obvious whether it is possible to establish the truth of formulas expressing the correctness of VPlS .
We have tried to prove (or disprove) the formulas that we obtained using three systems; a resolution based system called Otter [24] , an improved BDD based theorem prover [5, 141 and a commercially available prover [27] . The problems turned out too large to handle for Otter. However, it should be noted that the structure of formulas tends to transform into relatively small conjunctive normal forms. Therefore, the failure of the system Otter does not say anything about the suitability of resolution for our purpose. Based on some small experiments we actually expect resolution to do reasonably well.
In strong contrast with its rumored successes, plain BDD techniques did not get us anywhere, but with the improvement described in [14] sliced formulas in STATIC could be proven/disproved in times up till a minute whereas the unsliced formulas took approximately one hour. All these results have been obtained on a Sparc server 10 with 256 MB of memory.
The system of [27] seems to be able to handle the unsliced formulas in a few seconds. This is very promising especially as this method was able to establish the truth of all safety requirements at HoornKersenboogerd formulated in 1131. Moreover, in order to know whether the techniques presented in here scale up to larger railway yards, some safety requirements have been checked for the VPI that will be installed at the railway station in Heerhugowaard. Checking these turned out to be straightforward as well. Although the system of 1271 performs well we do not have a sufficient understanding of it to give a firm assessment of this method.
We can conclude that there exist methods and tools to establish the truth or falsity of formulas expressing safety of VPI controlled railway yards. However, it is disturbing that different techniques from propositional logic differ so much in applicability. It seems that a theoretical investigation in this phenomenon is highly desired.
Concluding Remarks and F'uture Research
In this paper a model has been presented in pCRL of an interlocking as currently in use with the Dutch Railway Company. Furthermore, a framework for correctness criteria was formulated in the modal logic for pCRL. It was shown how correctness criteria that conform to this framework can be verified automatically. For automated verification a number of tools were used, of which most have first been specified in ASF+SDF and later implemented in C. Using this approach the safety requirements in [13] , expressing correctness of the Vital Processor Interlocking at the station Hoorn-Kersenboogerd, could be proven. Experiments show that the technique is applicable to larger control systems. However, we feel that this is only a first step. We see a number of problems and questions that we feel should be addressed. They can be distinguished in three classes. The first is about technical questions that relate specifically to our approach.
If requirements from JUST have been checked, they can refer to points in time before the VLC has started. This has not yet been investigated sufficiently.
0 How should one model and verify a set of connected VPIs? We used &€U to make such a transition relatively easy but it is not clear whether the techniques presented in this paper are applicable to this setting.
High level correctness can be expressed in the form that trains do not derail and do not collide. It were preferable if such high level requirements were the starting point of any investigation on safety as we can more easily accept that they are complete. It were nice if the low level safety criteria could be proven complete against these high level ones. Of course, this would require knowledge on and formalization of the ideal behavior of train personnel. But as railway companies have made a start with this in numerous handbooks, this would certainly not be impossible.
The second class deals with the limits of the current approach and the applicability of alternative techniques.
0 It would be nice to get a fundamental understanding of the limits of this method. Where does the technique break down? According to our experience it were generally the built in limits of tools that caused problems. How far can we look into the past or the future? How complicated can the control of the railway become before other methods need to be applied?
The techniques presented in this paper are in a sense brute force techniques. Is it feasible to verify the correctness of VPIs in a more analytical way?
Following, for instance the approach presented in [25, 301.
The last class of questions deals with the fundamental reasons why our method did work; in particular why the application of the theorem prover of [27] was effective to prove safety of railway control systems.
It would be interesting to be able to classify the formulas that we have generated as 'easy' for theorem provers. We would like to understand why the NP-completeness paradigm saying that large propositional formulas cannot be proven or disproved does not appear applicable.
